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Abstract As a burgeoning field, Social Signal Processing
(SSP) needs a solid grounding in the disciplines that have
developed important concepts in the study of communica-
tion. However, the number and diversity of terms developed
in linguistics, psychology, and the behavioural sciences may
seem confusing for scholars who are not versed in the sub-
tleties of conceptual analysis and theoretical developments.
Indeed, different disciplines sometimes use the same term to
mean different things or, conversely, use different terms to
mean the same thing. The goals of this article are to present
an overview of the different concepts developed in the vari-
ous disciplines that studied animal and human communica-
tion, and to understand the differences and commonalities
between concepts emerging from these disciplines. We con-
clude that such an understanding will greatly improve the
efficiency of pluridisciplinary research projects, for the ad-
vancement of SSP requires that we look at the complexity of
communication from different angles.
Keywords Communication · Social signal processing ·
Non-verbal behaviour · Social signals · Social cues ·
Meaning
M. Mehu ()
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva,
Rue des Battoirs, 7, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland
e-mail: marc.mehu@unige.ch
F. D’Errico
Francesca D’Errico, Department of Education, University
Roma Tre, Via Ostiense, 161, 00154 Rome, Italy
D. Heylen
Department of Computing Science, Human Media Interaction,
University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede,
The Netherlands
Although it is commonly used to characterize the treatment
of socio-communicative behaviour by organisms [80, 100]
or by computer algorithms [74], the use of the term “Social
Signal Processing” (SSP) as a label for an academic field
originates in a paper by Vinciarelli, Pantic, & Bourlard [97].
This paper described the importance of looking at social in-
teractions in a holistic way, considering not only the verbal
exchanges between individuals but also the nonverbal as-
pects of face-to-face communication. The aim of that foun-
dation paper was to stimulate research towards automatic
analysis of human communicative behaviour with the ul-
timate goal of building socially intelligent machines [97].
Clearly, Vinciarelli et al. [97] was a call to unite the branch
of computer science interested in the automatic analysis
of human social behaviour with researchers in the “human
sciences” investigating face-to-face communication. Early
writings in SSP, however, were not quite explicit as to what
exactly was meant by social signals, sometimes importing
concepts from evolutionary biology (e.g. see [75, p. 2]), so-
cial psychology [4, 22], and psycholinguistics [57]; while
placing a strong emphasis on nonverbal behaviour. Viewed
from the outside of computer science, early writings in SSP
could give the feeling that anything deemed to be important
in a social interaction should be considered a social signal.
This is, of course, not the case.
In order to anchor their discipline in the rich concep-
tual background developed in linguistics and behavioural
sciences, SSP researchers are faced with the difficult task
of defining a theoretical framework that describes the phe-
nomena they are eager to automatically detect, interpret, and
synthesize. The reliance on theories developed in the be-
havioural sciences and linguistics is therefore crucial if the
output of SSP is to be considered credible within a wider
scientific community. Collaboration between psychologists,
behavioural scientists, linguists and computer scientists is
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therefore an essential step in the progress that SSP will make
towards a respected discipline.
The commitment of SSP to pluridisciplinarity does not
come without problems. The adoption of a theoretical
framework for SSP faces a major issue: the great diversity of
conceptual ideas about social signals and communicative be-
haviour stemming from the many approaches that study hu-
man interaction. Psychology, linguistics, and ethology have
developed a myriad of ideas, definitions, and methods for
the study of communication. In itself, this may be seen as
a strength more than a weakness because having multiple
approaches increases the potential for a good understanding
of the complexities of human behaviour. This diversity only
becomes an issue when people of different traditions come
to work together in pluridisciplinary projects in which they
have to cooperate to make a substantial move towards scien-
tific breakthrough. The increasing specialization that charac-
terizes most scientific disciplines can be a barrier to pluridis-
ciplinarity, for it can hinder communication between schol-
ars who understand and define concepts in different ways.
In fact, for communication to be successful, one has to
use terms that will be understood by all members of a net-
work in an agreed upon way. In an attempt to overcome this
difficulty, we decided to describe the different approaches
and concepts adopted by the human sciences studying hu-
man interaction as represented in Social Signal Processing
research. This paper presents a non-exhaustive glossary of
terms generated by different fields (ethology, social psy-
chology, cognitive psychology, linguistics, semiotics, and
mathematics) to study communication (Table 1). While dis-
cussing the definitions of key concepts that revolve around
social signalling, we will present commonalities and dif-
ferences between a variety of approaches, so that scholars
who are not familiar with the different disciplines can have
a clearer idea of what the different positions are.
Our goal is not to create a common definition for the con-
cept of social signal because it would deny the specificities
of each field and would constitute, for some, a loss of con-
ceptual clarity. In addition, creating a summary-like defini-
tion would be counter-productive for SSP because it would
close the door to scholars who may feel that their work is
only partially recognized by the field. As a pluridisciplinary
venture, our aim is to avoid the creation of a monolithic view
that is unlikely to be adopted by the scientific community
at large, or that may block the development of new ideas
or research projects. Instead, our goal is to expose our di-
versity in a way that respects everyone’s research agenda
and that encourages adhesion of new members to the SSP
community. For the reasons that it is virtually impossible to
create definitions that include everyone’s opinion (some of
the reasons will be discussed in a later section), and that ev-
eryone’s opinion should be respected, the present glossary
of concepts is an expandable collection of the different ap-
proaches used to study social signals and human communi-
cation. This paper presents some concepts used by the major
actors in communication research and briefly discusses the
differences and commonalities between approaches.
1 Information and meaning
One of the most influential models of communication de-
rives from efforts aimed at improving the efficiency of mes-
sage transmission over long distances [90]. This laid the
foundation of the Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver model
of communication [12], a model that massively influenced
modern research in linguistics, psychology, and ethology.
Cognitive psychology further developed theoretical mod-
els that show how different levels of intentionality [2,
39], or goals (internal or external, conscious, unconscious
and tacit [20, 76, 78]) may contribute to the differentia-
tion of signals. In addition psychology of communication
developed “dialogical” [37] and discursive approaches [43]
that consider not only the sender’s perspective but also the
addressee’s, seen as a contribution to the sender’s mes-
sage. In this perspective, linguistic communication is con-
sidered as a shared [3] and dynamic process of construc-
tion/reconstruction of meanings [24, 60, 98], where the
“constructed” meaning is the result of inputs from both
sender and addressee.
Meaning is considered a major aspect of communica-
tion and this concept occupies a central role in the field
of linguistics and philosophy (in particular the philosophy
of language). The notion of meaning is complex and tricky
and we will point out some issues here. According to Saus-
sure [83], meaning is the conceptual side—the signified—of
a sign. The form of a sign, he called the “signifier”. A sign
is thus a pairing of a signifier and a signified. The meaning
(an internal abstract representation that can be attached to
some signal, for example a word) should be distinguished
from the referent (the concrete or abstract object a signal
refers to). Frege [36] made an important distinction between
“Sinn” and “Bedeutung”, commonly translated as “sense”
and “reference”. The classical example to illustrate this dis-
tinction is the meaning of the expressions “Morning Star”
and “Evening Star”. As they refer to the same object, they
have the same referent but their sense is different.
In the Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver model of com-
munication, the Sender encodes meaning in some particu-
lar form which is sent to the Receiver who decodes it. For
communication to work in this model, it is important that
Sender and Receiver share the code. Typically, in language,
the code is based on conventions that speakers need to learn.
But the way in which the meaning and the form are related
can differ.
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Table 1 Definitions of important concepts for social signal processing
Ethology
Signal (information) Animal signals are acts or structures that alter the behaviour of other organisms, which evolved because of that effect,
and which are effective because the receiver’s response has also evolved [56]. Signals must carry information—about
the state or future actions of the signaller, or about the external world—that is of interest to the receiver.
A signal is the vehicle for the provision of information from a sender to a receiver [14].
Signal (influence) Animal signals are specialized, species-typical morphologies or behaviours that influence the current or future
behaviour of another individual [67].
Cue A feature of the world, animate or inanimate, which can be used by individuals as a guide to future action [44].
Display Behaviour pattern that has been modified in the course of evolution to convey information [11]. Displays are usually
constituted of several components, like cues and signals.
Handicap A signal whose reliability is ensured because its cost is greater than those required to efficiently convey the
information [103]. The signal may be costly to produce, or have costly consequences [96].
Index A signal whose intensity is causally related with the information that is being signalled and that cannot be faked [55].
Indices are equivalent to performance-based signals [35].
Minimal-cost signal A signal whose reliability does not depend on its cost (different from a handicap) and which can be made by most
members of a population (different from an index) [56].
Conventional signal A signal that has no physical or physiological reason to be correlated with underlying quality [54].
A signal which design is more or less arbitrarily related to a message. Since many of these signals can carry the same
message there is a need for consensus among perceivers [41].
Psychology
Cue A stimulus that serves as a sign or signal of something else, the connection having previously been learned [101].
Distal cues Externalization of stable traits or transient states, can be motor expression or physical appearance [15, 85].
Proximal percept Mental representation resulting from the perceptual process of distal cues [15, 85].
Social signal Human social signals are acts or structures that influence the behaviour or internal state of other individuals, that
evolve because of that effect, and that are effective because the perceiver’s response has also evolved; signals may or
may not convey conceptual information or meaning [58].
Social signal Communicative or informative signal that, either directly or indirectly, conveys information about social actions,
social interactions, social emotions, social attitudes and social relationships [77].
Sign Refers to an act that is informative but that was not necessarily produced to communicate information [33].
Emblem Nonverbal act which has a direct verbal translation that is known by all members of a group, class, or culture [30, 34].
Emblems are not necessarily arbitrary with regards to their meaning and can be iconic (i.e. their form resembles their
meaning).
Illustrator Movement directly tied to speech that illustrates what is said verbally [30, 34].
Regulator Act that maintains and regulates the conversation between two or more individuals [34].
Manipulator Act that represents adaptive efforts to satisfy bodily needs, actions, to manage emotions, to develop interpersonal
contacts, or to learn instrumental activities (see also adaptor in [34]).
Emotional expression Observable act that is specific to a particular emotion [32, 95], or to an underlying emotional dimension [86].
Linguistics and semiotics
Sign A two-sided psychological entity encompassing a physical side (signifier) and a conceptual side (signified, the
meaning), where the signifier “stands for” the signified, and is associated with it [83]. Different types of signs (e.g.
icon, index, symbol) are distinguished for the different ways in which the meaning is associated with the
signifier [71].
Index A sign pointing to the meaning by means of a causal relation to it. For example, tracks and symptoms indicate their
cause: smoke indicates fire, footprint indicates animal.
Icon A sign that physically resembles what it stands for. For example, onomatopoeic words.
Symbol A sign with an arbitrary connection between signifier and signified. For example, words in a language.
Signal The word “signal” is not typically used in linguistics. Allwood [1] uses the term as follows: A manipulatory action
that is intended to make a receiver apprehend a certain object. Clark [23] uses the term to refer to “the acts by which
one person means something for another” (these are not necessarily linguistic acts).
Speech act An act performed through language [7, 88]. Every sentence is a speech act, and has a locutionary aspect (it is an
action performed by uttering words), an illocutionary aspect (in uttering a sentence one performs an act towards
someone else) and a perlocutionary aspect (through language people can produce effects on other people, like being
alerted, scared, persuaded. . . ). A speech act includes a performative (the Speaker’s communicative intention, of
informing, asking, warning, apologizing. . . ) and a propositional content.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Indirect speech act A speech act which real meaning is different from the apparent one. For example, a request in form of a question
(“Can you pass the salt?”) [88].
Communicative act An act performed by any productive modality, gaze, gesture, facial expression, aimed at conveying to an Addressee
some meaning that includes a performative and a content [76].
Act of display A manipulatory action that is intended to make a receiver at least apprehend or attend to a certain object, through
some manner of apprehension like direct observation or influence [1].
Turn-taking The fact that participants in a conversation speak one after the other, which is governed by specific rules. The
fulfillment or violation of turn-taking rules in a conversation provides cues about its cooperative or competitive
structure [28, 82].
Backchannel Feedback and comments provided by listeners during face-to-face conversation, through non-intrusive short
verbalisations and nonverbal signals [99].
Processes and concepts associated with the production and perception of social signals
Communication Process in which meaningful information is made available through the use of signals produced by a sender and
processed by a receiver.
An alternative view considers communication as a reciprocal process in which signallers attempt to manage the
behaviour of perceivers, who in turn must assess the implications of signals with regards to their own interests in a
given context [65].
Sender/Signaller The producer of a given signal.
Receiver/Perceiver The perceiver of a given signal or cue. The perceiver need not always be in the vicinity of the signaller to perceive
the signal (e.g. in assisted communication).
Information (mathematics) Any physical property of the world that reduces uncertainty in the individual that perceives it [90].
Code Principle of correspondence between the act and its meaning [34]. The code can be intrinsic, extrinsic, and iconic.
Encoding The process, taking place in the signaller, of relating the distal cue and its meaning. Transfer of information in one
domain (e.g. thought, stance, attitude, emotion) to another domain (muscular contraction, blood concentration,
chemical, etc.).
Decoding The process of relating the proximal percept to a semantic category or some other form of representation, using the
same code that served to elaborate the signal.
Modality The body organs or sensory system involved in the production and the perception of signals. Humans
communicate in various modalities: auditory, visual, olfactory, and tactile.
Channel The different systems that compose each modality. For example, in humans the auditory modality includes
language and nonverbal vocalizations; the visual modality includes facial expression, gestures, postures, etc.
Multimodality The principle through which signals involve more than one modality of production and perception, for example
laughter uses the auditory and visual modality.
Context All the cues present in the physical and social environment of a perceiver as well as perceiver’s characteristics that
surrounds the signal.
Object In Peirce’s theory, an object (or semiotic object) is a subject of matter of a sign and an interpretant. It can take
various forms, e.g. a thought, an event, a material thing, an argument, or can even be fictional. Objects can be
immediate (the object as it is represented in the sign) or dynamic (the object as it really is).
Interpretant In Peirce’s theory, an interpretant is the sign’s meaning or ramification, it is the representation of the difference
that signs (undeceptive signs) would make for perceivers. The dynamic interpretant is the effect that the sign
actually has on a perceiver, whereas the final interpretant is the effect that the sign would have on the perceiver
given optimal circumstances, or the sign’s purpose.
Referent An idea, event, or material object that designates what a sign “stands for” [21]. The object which the signal
mentions or to which it refers [36, 64].
Meaning The conceptual or sensori-motor information that can be drawn from some perceptual stimulus. The meaning is
the conceptual side—the signified—of a sign [83] and it is distinct from the referent. There are variants of the
concepts of meaning.
Natural meaning Natural meaning makes reference to the stable relation that exists between cause and effect. Grice [38] speaks of
natural sense for verbal expressions that represent such relationship.
Meaning non-natural Non-natural meaning (meaningNN) makes reference to the intention a speaker has when communicating something
to an audience [38]. This definition implies that someone means (meaningNN) something by some utterance if and
only if it is uttered with the intention that the addressee recognizes the intention underlying the utterance produced.
Appeal In Bühler’s [16] Organon Model, appeal refers to the way a sign affects the perceiver, independently of the content
of the sign [46].
Inference New information drawn from previous information through a process of reasoning.
Ground truth A term, with origins in cartography and aerial imaging, used to describe data that can be taken as definitive, and
against which systems can be measured.
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Fig. 1 A mixture of iconic and symbolic
Peirce made a distinction between three types of signs:
icons, indices, and symbols. Icons, resemble the objects they
represent perceptually. Pictures and diagrams are typical
icons. Indices bear a spatial or causal connection between
the form and what they represent. Classical examples to il-
lustrate indices are the weathercock or the spots that indicate
measles. For symbols, the relation between form and mean-
ing is by rule, typically by convention. Words and phrases
are prototypical symbols in this sense.
A sign does not necessarily belong exclusively to one
class. Consider, for instance the traffic sign of Fig. 1. By
convention, the sign tells drivers that a traffic light is ap-
proaching. The meaning of this sign is laid down in the traf-
fic code and therefore we can say that this is a symbol. In
particular the use of the red triangle pointing upwards is a
convention to mean: “watch out, you are approaching some-
thing”. The picture of the traffic light is making it clear what
it is that one should be watching out for. This element of the
meaning of the traffic sign is thus presented iconically.
In Grice [38]—one of the central papers on meaning—
a distinction is made between the concept meaningNN
(where NN stands for non-natural) and “natural meaning”.
Indices are typical instances where natural meaning is in-
volved. The central concept in Grice’s notion of meaningNN
is intention: someone means something by some utterance if
and only if it is uttered with the intention that the addressee
recognizes the intention underlying the utterance produced.
For Grice “what words mean is a matter of what people
mean by them” [40, p. 340]. To illustrate the concepts a bit
further, consider Grice’s account of frowning.
If I frown spontaneously, in the ordinary course of
events, someone looking at me may well treat the
frown as a natural sign of displeasure. But if I frown
deliberately (to convey my displeasure), an onlooker
may be expected, provided he recognizes my intention
still to conclude that I am displeased. [38, p. 383]
This shows that communication can work in various ways.
In the case of the deliberate frown, the onlooker may rec-
ognize the fact that the frown is deliberate or the onlooker
might miss the deliberative aspect.
The relation to meaning and the intention of the sig-
naller are major defining criteria in the linguistic approach
to social signals. The concepts of sign and referent are
also central to the linguistic approach, which, because of
its early focus on human language and symbolic commu-
nication, has mostly developed around the idea of informa-
tion transfer. When people communicate using natural lan-
guage, they utter words and phrases not just to convey the
meaning that is conventionally attached to the expressions.
The pragmatic level considers that a particular combination
of words—a sentence—also constitutes a social action per-
formed towards others [7]. Searle [88] called these social ac-
tions speech acts. They include the Speaker’s performative
(the communicative intention of informing, asking, warning,
apologizing. . . ) and propositional contents. This can take in-
teresting forms. Consider for example, the case where some-
body replies to the question “Shall we go out for a walk?”
with the utterance “It’s raining.” Besides being an utterance
that can be truthful or not (the propositional content in se-
mantic terms), it could also “mean”, on the level of prag-
matics: ‘No, I don’t want to go out’ or ‘We should take an
umbrella with us’. These implied meanings are the essence
of social interaction. They form a huge challenge for Social
Signal Processing.
If, linguistically, signals are generally understood as hav-
ing stable connections to corresponding meanings; the ad-
vent of nonverbal communication research (e.g. [5, 42, 59])
did not come with a massive change of paradigm, as the
transmissive model of communication (as pointed out by
[21]) remained the foundation to understand the role of non-
verbal cues in social interaction. Mainstream research in an-
imal and human communication indeed considers that so-
cial signals convey information and meaning to receivers.
In this view, a signal constitutes material that is coded by a
sender, that is transmitted through dedicated channels (e.g.
face, voice, body) and that is decoded by receivers who
thereby retrieve information and meaning. Owren & Ba-
chorowski [66] claimed that models based on this approach
work on a number of assumptions that may not necessarily
apply to nonverbal communication. For example this view
assumes that information is encoded into a signal, which
then becomes a vehicle for socially relevant messages. The
effect of context on the interpretation of social signals is at
odds with this view because the meaning of an encoded mes-
sage should be intrinsic to the signal itself, making its inter-
pretation less subject to influence by contextual information.
An extreme case of nonverbal signal that do not in-
volve intrinsic meaning is the pointing gesture. According
to Tomasello [94], communicative gestures such as point-
ing (or gazing) do not contain encoded information in and
of themselves but function to orient perceivers’ attention to
184 J Multimodal User Interfaces (2012) 6:179–189
specific contextual information. Rather than being encoded
in the signal, the relevant information has to be inferred by
perceivers from contextual cues and from shared knowledge
about that context (physical and social environment, past ex-
periences, etc.). Consequently, the semantic principles that
apply to the study of human language should not generally
apply to the study of other social signals like human nonver-
bal behaviour [66], or animal signals [79]. In other words,
the semantic or referential component of human language
may not necessarily be shared by other channels of commu-
nication.
2 What are social signals?
Different disciplines adopt different ways of defining a so-
cial signal. For example, in ethology, animal signals are acts
or structures that affect the behaviour of other organisms,
which evolved because of that effect, and which is effec-
tive because the receiver’s response has also evolved [56].
Most ethologists contend that signals are vehicles that ma-
terialize the transfer of information from a sender to a re-
ceiver [14, 45, 93]. However, the exclusive reliance on infor-
mation transfer may result more from researcher’s tendency
to model animal communication on human language than
from solid conceptualization of key terms such as informa-
tion and encoding [79]. In evolutionary terms, the transfer of
information is not a requirement for a signal to evolve, pro-
vided that the signal provokes a response in perceivers that
is adaptive to signallers [51]. A crucial question is whether
the perceiver’s reactions to signals are mediated by psycho-
logical mechanisms of inference that maximize acquisition
of information before releasing a response. From an evolu-
tionary point of view, such filtering mechanism is expected
because it would optimize perceivers’ responses to social
contingencies, for example by preventing social exploitation
from skilful signallers. However, the existence of perceptual
mechanisms that evolved to infer of adaptive social informa-
tion is not in itself evidence that social signals are vehicles
of encoded messages.
Consequently, there is a divide within the field of ethol-
ogy as to whether information or influence constitutes the
most important factor in signalling. Owren, Rendall, &
Ryan [67] proposed a definition of animal signalling based
on social influence, in their words, “animal signalling is the
use of specialized, species-typical morphology of behaviour
to influence the current or future behaviour of another in-
dividual” (p. 771). This definition is based on the idea that
communication is a process through which individuals man-
age their social environment via influence and assessment of
other group members, rather than a process of transferring
(reliably or not) pieces of information to others [65]. The
importance of social influence in communication is also un-
derlined in social psychological theories of nonverbal be-
haviour [29, 68] and constitutes a central aspect of the defi-
nition of human social signal proposed by Mehu and Scherer
[58], who reformulated the ethological definition of animal
signalling to include the specificity of human symbolic com-
munication. The latter authors defined human social signals
as acts or structures that influence the behaviour or internal
state of other individuals, that evolve because of that effect,
and that are effective because the perceiver’s response has
also evolved; signals may or may not convey conceptual in-
formation or meaning [58]. Mehu & Scherer’s definition of
social signals can be viewed as a way to combine two ma-
jor aspects of human communication: information transfer
through the use of symbols and social influence.
Another view on social signals is provided by Poggi &
D’Errico [77], who define a signal as “social” by its con-
tent: “social signals” are those signals that provide informa-
tion about social facts, i.e. social actions, social interactions,
social emotions, social attitudes, evaluation and stances, so-
cial relationships and social identities, where social action
is defined, for instance, as an action directed to another
agent while viewing it as a self-regulated agent, with its own
goals [25]. So, for social interaction, defined as a sequence
of social actions performed by two or more (biological or ar-
tificial) agents towards each other, typical social signals are
turn-taking and backchannel signals, through which partici-
pants in a conversation respectively manage the turn-taking
system, or provide feedback about their following and un-
derstanding.
Other social signals concern social emotions. In fact,
some emotions are “social” because of their argumentative
structure: they are two-arguments predicates, in that their
logical structure involves not only the person feeling the
emotion but also the other “towards whom” the emotion
is felt, as in envy, admiration, compassion. Other emotions
are social by their function of preserving the social goals of
image and self-image (e.g. shame, embarrassment, pride);
while guilt and compassion preserve the goals of preventing
an agent from doing or accepting harm to others [78].
Empirical findings in nonverbal behaviour research con-
ducted in social psychology have played a major role in the
development of SSP (see [4, 22], for the most cited psy-
chology papers in SSP). Even though the term “signal” has
been used in social psychology, the latter discipline has not
provided a formal definition of the concept. Instead, psy-
chologists seem to endorse a general dictionary definition
of signals that, by default, takes the assumptions of infor-
mation transfer (e.g. [10, 31, 52, 91]). In addition, psychol-
ogists tend to use the term indicator, sign, signal, and dis-
play interchangeably (e.g. [18, 50]), without nuancing these
terms. This is not to say that psychologists did not show in-
terest in classifying human nonverbal behaviour in different
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types. For example, Ekman [31, 33] made the distinction
between emotional and conversational facial signals. Spe-
cific categories of nonverbal acts were proposed by Ekman
and Friesen [34], who distinguished five major classes of
nonverbal behaviour: emblems, illustrators, adaptors (or ma-
nipulators), regulators, and emotional expressions. Although
not explicitly defined as social signals, these categories are
based on functional aspects of social interactions as well as
on the postulated antecedents of behaviour, which are often
taken as the encoded meaning of the signal.
The variety in definitions may be partly explained by
the use of different methodologies and the different em-
pirical questions that have driven research activities in dif-
ferent fields. For example, ethology has mostly focused
on the adaptive significance of behavioural patterns for
the organisms displaying them and the selective pressures
responsible for the evolution of signals [47]. Social psy-
chology, however, has been mostly interested in the direct
causes and mechanisms of social behaviour and has al-
ways placed a greater interest in discovering the significance
or meaning of a particular behaviour [81, 86]. This ten-
dency was particularly salient in facial expression research,
where scholars have argued over the meaning of facial ex-
pression, if they convey emotional states, cognitive evalua-
tions, action tendencies, or social motives [87, 102]. Finally,
aside from studying the structure of language and its mean-
ing, linguistics—in particular the branch of pragmatics—
investigates how utterances are used in social actions [7, 88]
but also how language is used in relation to context and
other signals (e.g. hand and head gestures) in order to convey
meaning [3]. The diversity in research methods and theoret-
ical interests led scholars to use different terms to describe
the same thing, or sometimes the same term, e.g. social sig-
nals, to describe different ideas. By no means should this
signify that one approach has more authority than the other,
or that a research question is more relevant than another. The
only drawback is that this state of affair may create confu-
sion in scholars who are interested in social signals but are
not familiar with the various ways of proceeding in human
and behavioural sciences.
The difficulty in making a definition that satisfies every-
one may not necessarily come from academic disparities but
rather from the importance that is given by different authors
to the role of information in communication. As we have
seen earlier, there is an on-going debate in ethology as to
whether information transfer should be the critical feature
of animal communication [65, 67, 79, 89]. This debate has
been carried into the field of SSP, as it is believed that some
aspects of human communication (mostly the non-symbolic
aspects, like nonverbal vocalizations, or a large proportion
of facial movements) do not function to convey encoded in-
formation from a sender to a receiver but to help individu-
als manage their social environment through social influence
[58]. The emphasis on social influence in the ethological
definition of human social signals implies that all human so-
cial signals have the potential to exercise influence on other
individuals but only some of them (the symbolic signals) are
vehicles of encoded information.
The definition of social signals proposed by Poggi &
D’Errico [77] places the emphasis on information transfer
as the main defining character of social signals. For the lat-
ter authors, it is not sufficient that a behavior or structure
influences another individual to be called a social signal, it
also has to carry information about social facts, i.e. social
actions, social interactions, social attitudes and social rela-
tionships. On the other hand, although Mehu & Scherer’s
definition acknowledges that social signals may convey in-
formation, it is not a requirement for an entity to do so in
order to be called a social signal, as the most important as-
pect for that definition is that the behavior (or morpholog-
ical structure) functions to induce a response in perceivers
that is adaptive to the signaler (whether or not the perceiver
benefits from gaining information). In addition, Poggi &
D’Errico [77] considers what ethologists call cues, i.e. in-
formative but not communicative entities (Table 1), as social
signals because social facts can also be inferred from them.
Ethological definitions, however, require that a behavior or
morphological structure has evolved as a result of their ef-
fects on perceivers in order to be called a social signal [56,
58, 67]. In sum, although both approaches recognize that
information transfer and influence are important aspects of
human communication, these principles are given different
weights in the definitions of social signals.
Beside the different uses of the term social signal, an-
other example of using the same term to mean different ideas
is provided with the use of the term cue. Ethology and per-
ception psychology both make use of the term cue to de-
scribe external stimulations. Although these disciplines use
different definitions for the same term (Table 1), the defini-
tions offered are not necessarily opposed. When perception
psychologists talked about the term cue they did not neces-
sarily have in mind the study of communication and there-
fore did not need to define the term in relation to signals, to
the contrary of ethologists, who have been versed in com-
munication research from the early days of their discipline.
The core element of a cue, as defined by ethologists and
perception psychologists, can therefore be said to be very
similar, as it underlines the association made by perceivers
between the cue and some relevant information. The concept
of cue is also very similar to the concept of “sign” taken in
its simplest form, i.e. as meaning something which occur-
rence indicates the occurrence of something that may not
be directly perceivable (for example, the presence of smoke
indicates fire or combustion). A sign is also distinct from
a signal because its occurrence is not necessarily linked to
communication; but, like any other stimulus, can be inter-
preted by perceivers to guide adaptive actions.
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3 Commonalities between approaches
Although we can see that research domains mostly differ in
the detailed elaborations they made with regards to the na-
ture of signals, their function, and their informative values;
the different views share a few features and principles that
are important for communication research. First, some acts
are considered functionally or intentionally communicative
(e.g. signals, emblems, communicative signals); whereas
others are simply considered as informative (cues, signs, in-
formative signals), suggesting that information can be de-
rived from them although they have not evolved, or are not
intended, for communication.1 The latter aspect most proba-
bly reflects people’s tendency to search the environment (so-
cial or physical) for information they can use to their benefit,
independently of communicative demands. Most theories of
communication therefore recognize that inference based on
proximal percepts is a major feature of communication that
can be relatively independent from the function and inten-
tion (conscious or unconscious) to send particular signals.
Most theories also recognize the existence of signals
which relation to meaning is arbitrary and follows social
conventions: symbols in linguistics [71], conventional sig-
nals in ethology [41], and emblems in social psychology [30,
34]. In linguistics, symbols are understood as signs that rep-
resent their objects independently of any resemblance to
them (unlike icons) or independently of any natural connec-
tion to them (unlike indices), but “because dispositions or
factitious habits of their interpreters insure their being so un-
derstood” [72, pp. 460–461]. In ethology, conventional sig-
nals are seen as signals which design and form is arbitrarily
related to the message conveyed [41]. Since the same infor-
mation could, in principle, be conveyed by many different
conventional signals, perceivers need to agree on the mean-
ing of these signals. Finally, although not all emblems are
arbitrarily coded, they are believed to have a much higher
proportion of shared than idiosyncratic meaning [34], which
would bring them closer to actual symbols.
Most approaches also recognize that social signals are
perceivable entities that produce a biological, cognitive or
behavioural response in a perceiver. For example a central
aspect of the ethological definition of social signals is that
signals have an influence on perceivers. In the same way,
the concept of appeal—defined by Bühler [16] as the way
signs affect perceivers—also considers social influence as
an important factor in communication. The concept of inter-
pretant introduced by Peirce [73] also covers the effect the
sign has on perceivers. In social psychology, one of the pos-
tulated functions of nonverbal behaviour is to exercise so-
cial influence [17, 68]. Given the observation that reactions
1Note that within the field of ethology, some authors consider signals
as information carrier (e.g. [14, 103]); while other authors see signals
as mostly influential [51, 65, 79].
to social signals can occur below the level of consciousness
[27, 61], the question of whether social influence is mediated
by mental inferences about meaning is still debatable. Since
automatic reactions to social signals most probably rely on
structures that are evolutionarily more ancient than the cog-
nitive structures responsible for symbolic communication, it
is unclear whether fast reactions to social signals are medi-
ated by the transformation of proximal percepts into amodal,
language-like, symbols; or if they result from direct connec-
tions between perception and action [26]. Matters are fur-
ther complicated by the observation that semantic priming
can also occur without awareness [62, 92], indicating that
symbolic messages can be processed automatically. A ma-
jor challenge for future research in communication will be
to specify the nature of mental representations involved in
the processing of social signals, more precisely to determine
whether these representations occur in a symbolic format or,
as suggested by embodiment theorists, if they are grounded
in their physical context and rely on the brain’s modality-
specific systems [63]. Answering such questions requires
that researchers consider alternative views on communica-
tion, for solutions may well come from the integration of
different approaches.
Another commonality between approaches is the recog-
nition that communication is multimodal, i.e. it involves
the interaction between different production and perception
modalities [3, 9, 70, 76]. The study of multimodal commu-
nication should be the first research topic to benefit from in-
tegrating different conceptual approaches. In a recent article,
Mehu & Scherer [58] proposed that the various components
of human multimodal signals have evolved to implement
two evolutionarily important aspects of human communi-
cation: information transfer [14] and social influence [67].
Complex communicative units such as multimodal signals
could indeed carry components that are designed to increase
information transfer [6, 49] and components that increase
the likelihood of a response by perceivers [8]. Such inter-
actions between components may be particularly critical in
human communication system, as it is rich in symbolic mes-
sages and non-symbolic components. Researchers in mul-
timodal communication should take these two aspects into
account if they want to enhance the predictive value of their
findings.
4 Conclusion
The absence of consensus in definitions most likely comes
from natural drifts in the elaboration of concepts by the dif-
ferent disciplines accentuated by the lack of communication
between these disciplines. The object of interest—human
communication, and the realities associated with it, e.g. so-
cial signals, remain the same across disciplines. The dif-
ferent approaches adopted by academic fields are reflected
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in differences in terminology, or in differences of meaning
for similar terms. Rather than underlying the differences in
views, conceptual developments in Social Signal Processing
should aim at emphasizing their commonalities and under-
standing the origin of their differences in order to avoid un-
necessary conflicts between researchers. Finally, it is the re-
sponsibility of each SSP scholar to get familiar with the dif-
ferent approaches and to choose the concepts that are most
appropriate for his/her specific research goals.
Increased communication and exchange between disci-
plines should also, ultimately, lead to a better integration of
the different concepts in a cohesive framework. For exam-
ple, modern ethological theory of signalling was strongly
influenced by game theoretic models proposed to explain
the evolution of communication [19, 53, 69]. The consider-
ation of costs and benefits of signalling behaviour has now
become paradigmatic in evolutionary approaches to com-
munication and has stimulated new ways of looking at be-
havioural data in a variety of academic fields like ethol-
ogy [48], economic psychology [84], or anthropology [13].
The constructive interactions that have developed between
the fields of economics and evolutionary biology is a good
example of how the integration of concepts and communi-
cation among disciplines lead to increased understanding of
complex phenomena.
A closer examination of the different concepts elaborated
by the different disciplines revealed a number of commonal-
ities and made the apparent differences between fields look
less important than they seem at first glance. Such common-
alities reflect the similar observations that have been made
on human communication and are expected given the com-
mon topic of study. Concepts that are common across dis-
ciplines are likely to be long lasting, for they appear to be
relatively independent from the philosophical and method-
ological orientations adopted by researchers. Commonali-
ties of this sort make collaborations between disciplines pos-
sible and create the bridges necessary for pluridisciplinary
projects to run smoothly.
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